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The historiography of the origins of the European Union (EU) has two main 
weaknesses. It is too state-centric and fails to conceptualise the embedded nature of 
ideas and their role in the creation and evolution of an integrated ‘core Europe’ 
after World War II. With the opening up of the archives of national governments 
and supranational institutions, research on the contemporary history of the EU has 
steadily moved on into the 1970s. We argue, however, that it is crucial to revisit the 
early postwar period to develop a more sophisticated notion and historical narrative 
of the formation of the supranational core Europe of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) of six founding member-states. Sectoral integration in coal 
and steel did not lead directly to horizontal integration in the customs union of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). It created important path dependencies 
concerning some structural characteristics and policy solutions, however, 
especially the (self-) exclusion of Britain, the functional use of economic 
integration with long-term political as well as economic objectives, the 
introduction of the supranational principle and antitrust competition legislation. 
Historians have predominately conceived of the formation of the ECSC as the 
result of interstate bargaining of ‘national interests’ by governments as cohesive, 
purposeful actors.1 Diplomatic historical accounts have been shaped by underlying 
‘realist’ assumptions about the definition of such interests by autonomous foreign 
and European policy-making elites. In the case of France, such national interests 
included the control of Germany through integration and securing a dominant 
political leadership role for France, and in the case of Germany, regaining national 
sovereignty and achieving the integration of the newly created Federal Republic of 
Germany in Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of equality. The 
notion of American ‘influence’ in the historiography of transatlantic relations after 
1945 similarly derives from the assumption of European state actors’ interests in 
the involvement of the United States as ‘ultimate arbiter’2 in Western European 
politics.3 In this perspective, the United States primarily had powerful political, 
economic and military resources to secure for itself a dominant position in the 
1. As an introduction to EU historiography see W. KAISER, From State to Society? The Historiography 
of European Integration, in: M. CINI, A.K. BOURNE (eds.), Palgrave Advances in European 
Union Studies, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2006, pp.190-208. 
2. G. LUNDESTAD, The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From ‘Empire by Integration’ 
to ‘Transatlantic Drift’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003 [1998]. 
3. See for example K. SCHWABE, ‘Ein Akt konstruktiver Staatskunst’ – die USA und die Anfänge 
des Schuman-Plans, in: Idem. (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman Plans 1950/51, Nomos, 
Baden-Baden, 1988, pp.211-239. 
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Atlantic Alliance. In contrast, Alan S. Milward has explained the origins of the 
ECSC with domestically derived, predominately economic interests of Western 
European states.4 He has emphasized their strategic goal of achieving trade and 
welfare gains in a larger internal market to sustain national welfare objectives and 
policies, as he argued in his most influential book, The European Rescue of the 
Nation-State.5 With its strong focus on bureaucratic policy-making, however, his 
conceptualisation of early European integration is almost equally state-centric and 
informed by ‘rational choice’ assumptions about national governments rationally 
defining interest-based policy objectives for interstate bargaining. Milward’s recent 
decision to replace the term ‘national interests’ with ‘strategies’ merely marks a 
semantic, not substantive concession.6 
None of this historical literature acknowledges the significance of ideas in early 
European integration as an independent variable. This is in part a reaction to the 
federalist hurrah historiography of early European integration in the tradition of 
Walter Lipgens, a committed federalist Christian democratic activist,7 and its 
underlying strong normative assumptions about the greater good of supranational 
institutionalisation.8 This literature never succeeded in establishing causal links 
between the ideas of the resistance and federalist movements in Europe and the 
actual European policies by governments after 1945. Similarly, much of the research 
centred around the role of Jean Monnet has overemphasized ideational motives and 
explained his influence with his role as leader of what appears like a tiny group of 
French officials who managed to stage a palace coup with the assistance of Foreign 
minister Robert Schuman as political figurehead.9 This literature, too, has largely 
failed to conceptualise how integration ideas advanced by Monnet and others were 
socially embedded and more importantly, how these actors actually succeeded in 
achieving their implementation in intergovernmental bargaining. 
Against this background we propose that contemporary historians should look 
to social science research for approaches to studying the current EU which they can 
utilize in the first instance as heuristic devices for addressing these and other 
weaknesses of the under-conceptualised integration history.10 We argue that the 
4. A.S. MILWARD, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, Methuen, London, 1984. 
5. A.S. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Routledge, London, 1992. 
6. A.S. MILWARD, The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963, Frank Cass, London 2002, 
p.6. 
7. On Lipgens see W. LOTH, Walter Lipgens (1925-1984), in: W. DUCHARDT et al. (eds.), Europa- 
Historiker. Ein biographisches Handbuch, vol.I, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006, 
pp.317-336; W. KAISER, “Überzeugter Katholik und CDU-Wähler”: Zur Historiographie der Integrationsgeschichte 
am Beispiel Walter Lipgens, in: Journal of European Integration History, 
8(2002), pp.119-128. 
8. W. LIPGENS, A History of European Integration, vol.I: 1945-1947, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1982 [German edition 1977]. 
9. See for example F.J. FRANSEN, The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins 
of the European Community, Greenwood, Westport 2001, pp.87-113. 
10. We also make this point strongly in W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), The History 
of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72, Routledge, 
London, 2008. 
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‘policy network’ approach has great potential for re-conceptualising the complex 
relations between different sets of actors and their policy ideas and preferences not 
only after core Europe institutionalisation, but also before the ECSC treaty came 
into force.11 In the social sciences, policy network analysis largely fed on the 
governance turn in public policy and international relations.12 As we have defined it 
elsewhere, this term denotes ‘a shift from centralised ‘government’ by cohesive 
state institutions exercising their clearly defined powers in hierarchical forms of 
decision-making towards decentralised and informal forms of political 
communication and decision-making by sets of state and non-state actors in less 
hierarchically structured or even non-hierarchical relationships’.13 In domestic 
political contexts social scientists observed from the 1980s onwards that the 
boundaries between state- and non-state actors became increasingly blurred and the 
exchange of resources between them – like expert knowledge and electoral support, 
for example – highly informal.14 In these fast changing circumstances of social 
communication and informal negotiation, policy networks linking different state 
and non-state actors play a central coordinating role in policy-making. Within the 
EU they do so within a system of ‘multilevel governance’ – a term intended to 
capture the specificity of the supranational polity as the interconnection of different 
layers of governance – the supranational, national and the regional and local – in a 
complex web of institutional and social relations.15 
Most social scientists tend to believe that policy networks in or as governance is 
a recent phenomenon resulting from what they see as the ‘hollowing-out’ of the 
nation-state from the 1970s onwards.16 We contend, however, that Western 
European states were less cohesive before the 1970s, that national governments 
were more fragmented and that they were often unable to agree and project 
cohesive ‘interests’ in intergovernmental bargaining, than the ‘hollowing out’ 
thesis about a decisive shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ after the oil crisis 
would make us believe. Indeed, we can relate in this regard to the shared 
assumption17 of authors like Lipgens and Milward that the Western European states 
were essentially weak after 1945 and that pro-integration elites sought to develop a 
11. As an introduction to its application to the study of EU politics see A. WARLEIGH, Conceptual 
Combinations: Multilevel Governance and Policy Networks, in: M. CINI, A.K. BOURNE (eds.), 
Palgrave Advances …, op.cit., pp.77-95. 
12. R.A.W. RHODES, Understanding Governance: Ten Years On, in: Organization Studies, 
28(2007), pp.1243-1264. 
13. M. GEHLER, W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, Networks in Informal European Governance: Diachronic 
Perspectives of the European Union as a Multi-level Polity, in: Idem., Netzwerke im europäischen 
Mehrebenensystem. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart / Networks in European Multilevel 
Governance. From 1945 to the Present, Böhlau, Vienna/Cologne/Weimar, 2008 (forthcoming). 
14. See also K. HEARD-LAURÉOTE, Transnational Networks. Informal Governance in the European 
Political Space, in: W. KAISER, P. STARIE (eds.), Transnational European Union: Towards 
a Common Political Space, Routledge, London, 2005, pp.36-60. 
15. For a recent overview see B. KOHLER-KOCH, B. RITTBERGER, Review Article: The ‘Governance 
Turn’ in EU Studies, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(2006), pp.27-49. 
16. See for example P. HIRST, Democracy and Governance, in: J. PIERRE (ed.), Debating Governance, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp.13-25, here p.19. 
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new common framework for ‘governing’. This political choice was highly 
contested domestically, however, as was the policy content of the new integration 
framework. Political parties were internally divided. After Schuman announced the 
plan for coal and steel integration on 9 May 1950, French socialists argued over 
whether they should prioritise supranational integration over British participation, 
for example. At the same time, opponents among the German Christian democrats 
of the new chancellor Konrad Adenauer feared that his policy of Western 
integration would make unification impossible. Leading civil servants in foreign 
and economic ministries were divided, too, for example over the exclusion of 
Britain or – in the light of the European cartel tradition – the desirability of antitrust 
legislation. As Matthias Kipping and others have shown,18 business interests also 
could not agree on important features of market integration in coal and steel. 
Against this background, we aim to analyse and ascertain how pro-integration 
political and administrative elites sought in this insecure policy environment to 
utilize mostly informal transnational networking to implement their ideas and 
preferences for the start of European integration. We do so drawing upon two case 
studies. We have chosen these case studies to test and bring out the influence of 
political and expert networks on agenda-setting and interstate negotiations in more 
narrowly continental European as well as geographically larger transatlantic 
settings. The first is the transnational political party network of Western European 
Christian democrats. At the time of the Schuman Plan, the Christian democrats 
alone formed national governments or were the largest party in coalition 
governments in all six ECSC founding member-states. Yet their political hegemony 
did not translate easily into government policy-making and intergovernmental 
bargaining due to internal divisions, coalition politics and domestic bureaucratic 
and business pressures. The second example is the transatlantic networks especially 
of civil servants and academic experts, not politicians, which included Monnet. 
Whereas the transnational networks of Christian democrats played a crucial role in 
agenda-setting up to the Schuman Plan including fundamental decisions like the 
combined supranationalism and exclusion of Britain from core Europe integration, 
the transatlantic network was more focussed on influencing the policy content of 
the interstate negotiations leading up to the signing of the ECSC treaty. In 
analysing these two networks we have to concentrate for the purposes of this article 
on essential information on their composition and in particular, their functions in 
the formation of core Europe. In conclusion, we briefly set out how the narrower 
17. W. LOTH, Die Beiträge der Geschichtswissenschaft zur Deutung der Europäischen Integration, 
in: W. LOTH, W. WESSELS (eds.), Theorien europäischer Integration, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 
2001, pp.87-106, here pp.91-96. 
18. M. KIPPING, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz. Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen 
Einigung 1944-1952, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1996; F.M.B. LYNCH, France and 
the International Economy. From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome, Routledge, London, 1997; J. GILLINGHAM, 
Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955. The Germans and French from Ruhr 
Conflict to Economic Community, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991. 
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social science policy network approach may have to be adjusted for empirically 
oriented historical narratives of European integration, and what our research 
suggests for assessing the temporal dimension of networks in multilevel 
governance in historical perspective. 
Christian democratic network: 
Excluding the ‘hereditary enemy’ Britain 
Catholic people’s parties originally formed transnational network-type contacts in 
interwar Europe.19 Whereas these loose contacts were dominated by left-Catholics 
with links to the Christian trade unions and the peace movement and a primary 
interest in national social policy reform, the new postwar network was largely 
controlled by liberal-conservative middle class Christian democrats. They 
organised their cooperation in the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI) created 
in 1947 which was transformed into the European Union of Christian Democrats 
(EUCD) in 1965, to be followed by the formation of the European People’s Party 
(EPP) in 1976, which included only parties from European Communities (EC) 
states. At the same time, however, leading Christian democrats also met secretly in 
the so-called Geneva Circle from 1947 onwards. These high-level meetings were 
mediated by two private citizens, the Frenchman Victor Koutzine, who had close 
links with Georges Bidault, and the German Johann Jakob Kindt-Kieffer. They 
were attended by Bidault, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Pierre Pflimlin, Konrad Adenauer, 
Josef Müller, Heinrich von Brentano and other leading politicians from the 
Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) and the Christian Democratic Union / 
Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) as well as other Western European parties. 
Their informal network-type collaboration extended to cooperation within the 
European Movement and the Assembly of the Council of Europe and included 
direct private contacts, for example between Adenauer and Schuman. 
We have identified five main functions of this transnational Christian 
democratic network in the run-up to the Schuman Plan and during the subsequent 
interstate negotiations.20 The first is the lasting creation of social trust and political 
capital. The meetings in the informal private setting of the Geneva Circle with its 
free-ranging open discussions in particular helped to create normative-emotional 
bonds between the networked party elites. This was of crucial importance at a time 
when the general public especially in France was still highly sceptical, if not 
outright hostile to reconciliation with Germany and its full inclusion in new forms 
19. W. KAISER, Von der Isolation im politischen Katholizismus in die (innere) Emigration. Transnationale 
Kooperation katholischer Volksparteien in Europa 1925-1933/38, in: J. MITTAG (ed.), 
Politische Parteien und europäische Integration. Entwicklung und Perspektiven transnationaler 
Parteienkooperation in Europa, Klartext, Essen, 2006, pp.215-228. 
20. For a more detailed source-based analysis see W. KAISER, Christian Democracy and the Origins 
of European Union, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, chapter 6. 
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of institutionalised integration on the basis of equality as foreseen in the Schuman 
Plan. The Christian democrats could confidentially discuss issues like German 
rearmament and prepare policy decisions without fear of domestic political 
recriminations. Their party cooperation allowed them to communicate their 
congruent political beliefs and preferences, which made their governmental 
decision-making and diplomacy more mutually reliable. In hazardous political 
situations as after Schuman’s visit to Bonn in January 1950 with the sharp public 
controversy about the anticipated signing of the Saar Conventions between France 
and the regional pro-French government in Saarbrücken, the Christian democrats 
could, and regularly did, activate their informal network contacts to smooth 
interstate relations. 
Secondly, their transnational networking allowed those Christian democrats, 
who strongly supported the formation of a tightly integrated core Europe, to 
monopolize external party contacts and marginalize dissent within their own 
parties. Thus, Adenauer used informal networks to ensure that his views on 
Franco-German reconciliation and European integration also became known to 
MRP leaders who did not know him from interwar European politics like Schuman. 
Once he had secured the position as preferred partner of his French interlocutors by 
early 1948, he systematically excluded from transnational resources all sceptics of 
his European policy among disparate groups in his own party from liberal free 
traders like Ludwig Erhard, to left-Catholic nationalists like Jakob Kaiser and 
protestant conservatives like Friedrich Holzapfel. Adenauer, the CDU leader in the 
British zone of occupation, once invited Kaiser to the Geneva Circle during the 
Berlin blockade in March 1949, who predictably embarrassed himself with his 
enthusiastic assessment of the prospects of agreeing a deal with Stalin over 
unification.21 Adenauer also made certain that the re-founded left-Catholic Centre 
Party would not be allowed to partake in party cooperation. Within the MRP, which 
most nationalist Popular Republicans left in 1947 to form a rival Gaullist party, the 
minimal dissent against the emerging core Europe agenda was articulated by 
left-wing politicians like Leo Hamon, who like their German counterparts were not 
included in party cooperation. Hamon recollected later how the small 
anti-supranational Left in the MRP became more and more marginalized by what 
he experienced as the growing ‘frenzied European fury’.22 The party network also 
helped socialise other leading Christian democrats into the emerging core Europe 
consensus. Thus, the Italian Prime minister Alcide De Gasperi, who was indirectly 
represented in the Geneva Circle by his confidant Paolo Emilio Taviani, initially 
adhered to a more Atlanticist foreign policy, but became converted to supranational 
integration. Bidault’s strong support in the Geneva Circle for a core Europe without 
Britain in turn was a crucial precondition for his backing as Prime minister for the 
Schuman Plan in the decisive ministerial meeting, despite some misgivings about 
21. Archiv für christlich-demokratische Politik (ACDP), 01-009-017, Geneva Circle, 8 March 1949. 
22. Cited in J.-C. DELBREIL, LMRP et la construction européenne: résultats, interprétation et conclusion 
d’une enquête écrite et orale, in: S. BERSTEIN, J.-M. MAYEUR, P. MILZA (eds.), Le 
MRP et la construction européenne, Éditions Complexe, Paris, 1993, pp.309-363, here p.356. 
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the foreseen degree of supranationalism. Informal networking also allowed the 
party elites to co-opt younger Christian democrats into their core Europe consensus 
like Leo Tindemans, Giulio Andreotti and Hans-August Lücker, who all took part 
in the NEI congress in Luxembourg in February 1948. 
Thirdly, their transnational networking allowed leading Christian democrats to 
develop and agree common policy objectives. Embedded in similar ideological 
traditions as well as their Catholic confessional experience, they shared what 
Markus Jachtenfuchs has called a ‘gesellschaftliches Deutungssystem’23, or social 
system for interpreting the world. On this basis, their informal cooperation between 
1947 and 1950 allowed the Christian democrats to formulate two strong closely 
related preferences: achieving some degree of supranational integration and 
provoking the self-exclusion of Britain from new European projects. The protocols 
of the Geneva Circle meetings demonstrate how deep the antagonism was amongst 
most transnationally networked Catholic Christian democrats, not only towards the 
ruling Labour Party, but also Britain with its alien protestant political culture and – 
as they saw it – its divide et impera foreign policy tradition precluding any 
long-term commitment to politically meaningful integration. In June 1949 Bidault 
concluded in the Geneva Circle that ‘an English Europe […] means no Europe at 
all’.24 Later, in January 1955, he and Teitgen over lunch even spoke of Britain as 
France’s ‘hereditary enemy’.25 Some British middle-class Catholics initially had 
weak contacts with the NEI as an extension of Catholic cooperation in exile.26 
Catholics played only a marginal role in the leadership of both larger parties, 
Labour and the Conservatives, however. Moreover, the vast majority of Catholic 
voters actually supported the Labour Party, which dominated the newly formed 
Socialist International.27 
Their transnational cooperation – fourthly – allowed the Christian democrats to 
identify suitable political party and societal allies for constructing a sufficiently 
strong transnational coalition for their supranational core Europe without Britain. It 
was especially crucial to recruit the French socialists for the Schuman Plan. They 
were the most important ‘Third Force’ coalition partner, but had a strong affinity 
for cooperation with Britain. This political need in turn required a deeper 
understanding on the part of the German and Italian Christian democrats, who 
competed with socialist parties for government control, for the diplomacy of 
inviting the Labour Party to exclude itself, which it duly did with a ‘Euro-sceptic’ 
23. M. JACHTENFUCHS, Die Konstruktion Europas. Verfassungsideen und institutionelle Entwicklung, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2002, p.262. 
24. ACDP, 01-009-017, Geneva Circle, 10 June 1949. 
25. ACDP, 01-172-31, Geneva Circle, 31 January 1955, protocol Karl von Spreti. 
26. See W. KAISER, Co-operation of European Catholic Politicians in Exile in Britain and the USA 
during the Second World War, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 35(2000), pp.439-465. 
27. On the religious and confessional dimensions of the marginal societal support in Britain for some 
kind of ‘united Europe’ after 1945 see also P.M. COUPLAND, Britannia, Europa and Christendom. 
British Christians and European Integration, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2006. 
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policy manifesto and negative government decision, as a precondition for the 
support of the French socialists. 
The fifth function was to help construct alliances with leading civil servants in 
ministries to prevent national administrations from throwing spanners in the wheels 
of interstate negotiations. While Monnet’s integration concept was far too 
technocratic for the Christian democrats, and he was not close to them politically, 
they still worked with him and pro-integration civil servants in the Quai d’Orsay to 
marginalize dangerous internal dissent. After all, the French state administration 
was initially a stronghold of resistance to the supranational core Europe of 
integrated markets. The economic ministries were steeped in the tradition of 
protectionism and the Quai d’Orsay attached to Gaullist ideas of national greatness 
and power. Thus, René Massigli, the French ambassador to London, cautioned time 
and again against any German adventure without full British involvement. At 
times, the Christian democratic network also had to deal with deliberate leaks by 
hostile civil servants from within French ministries to prevent informal agreements 
as during one attempt in 1954 to sort out the contentious Saar issue. The Christian 
democrats also parachuted transnationally networked politicians into key positions 
as in the case of Taviani, who was appointed state secretary in the Palazzo Chigi 
and chief Italian ECSC negotiator, and von Brentano who was to chair the 
Constitutional Committee of the Ad hoc Assembly which drafted the European 
Political Community treaty in 1953. 
All of these functions together greatly facilitated what political scientists with 
an interest in the role of individuals within policy networks, or more generally in 
EU politics, have called entrepreneurial leadership.28 Traditional concepts for 
explaining political leadership like Max Weber’s notion of charisma, for example, 
have little relevance for the emerging multilevel European polity of 
intergovernmental bargaining and supranational institutionalisation. After the 
experience of Hitler and Mussolini, all Christian democratic leaders more or less 
ran – as Bidault once said about Schuman – on petrol of low octane rating. In 1950, 
moreover, they could neither rely on a permissive consensus on supranational 
integration nor expect guaranteed electoral benefits from the new policy. Despite 
American support for Schuman’s policy of going it alone without Britain, the 
domestic and international policy-making environment remained highly insecure. 
In these adverse circumstances, their informal transnational party cooperation 
made their European policies mutually reliable and thus also helped reduce 
domestic political risks in a decisive way to facilitate bold and at times extremely 
controversial policy choices. Christian democratic politicians could largely 
exercise crucial political leadership in early European integration in and through 
networks. 
28. See also, albeit in the context of intergovernmental conferences, D. BEACH, C. MAZZUCELLI, 
Introduction, in: idem. (eds.), Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 
2007, pp.1-21. For interesting conceptual insights see O.R. YOUNG, Political Leadership 
and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society, in: International 
Organization, 45(1991), pp.281-308. 
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Transatlantic networks: 
Promoting a free market economy for an integrated Europe 
Informal transatlantic cooperation did not originate in 1945. However, the 
immediate post-World War II period gave rise to an especially increased density of 
contacts between American and European actors at a number of levels. Against this 
backdrop, two transatlantic networks of civil servants and academic experts with 
mutually relating actors developed at the Schuman Plan conference.29 A network 
attached to the American embassy in Paris and in part overlapping with the French 
delegation mainly comprised actors who cooperated in US and European 
administration agencies in the reconstruction of postwar Western Europe, including 
the French Planning Commission, the US High Commission for Germany and the 
European Co-operation Administration (ECA). Jean Monnet and US High 
commissioner John McCloy, whose friendship went back to the interwar period, 
facilitated the operation of what we call the ‘US embassy working group’ to 
expedite the successful conclusion of the interstate negotiations. Another informal 
network, the ‘transatlantic university network’, partly overlapped with the West 
German delegation and consisted of legal experts with an academic affiliation. This 
network shared important characteristics of what Peter M. Haas first called an 
‘epistemic community’.30 Crucial to its formation was the nomination of Walter 
Hallstein, a law professor at the University of Frankfurt, as head of the West 
German delegation. 
We have identified five main functions of these transatlantic networks in the 
interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan. The first is that informal transatlantic 
networks restricted the policy options available to the delegations and the 
designated conference working groups of experts. The US embassy working group 
in particular helped safeguard the compatibility of the ECSC treaty with the US 
government’s policy preference for a supranational, integrated and competitive 
Western Europe. In accordance with the ‘double containment’ strategy vis-à-vis 
Germany and the Soviet Union the Truman administration promoted the integration 
of a democratic, capitalist and economically restored Germany into Western 
Europe to limit Soviet expansion. At the same time US postwar foreign policies 
including the Marshall Plan were informed by a rationale derived from the 
domestic tradition of US antitrust law, namely that competition provided the key to 
the dual goal of political stability and economic prosperity. Against this 
background, the US embassy working group reinforced restraining the policy 
options of the negotiating parties through assisting the constant flow of information 
29. For a source-based description see B. LEUCHT, Transatlantische Politiknetzwerke: Kulturtransfer 
und Schuman-Plan 1950/51, in: Comparativ, 16(2006), pp.200-218. 
30. P. HAAS, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, in: International 
Organization, 1(1992), pp.1-35. For an early call to utilize the epistemic community and 
other policy network approaches cf. R. DWAN, Un outil puissant: les théories de l’élite et l’étude 
de la construction européenne, in: E. du RÉAU (ed.), Europe des élites? Europe des peuples? La 
construction de l’espace européen, 1945-1960, Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, 1998, pp.27-38. 
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between these parties and US State Department and ECA officials and commenting 
policy papers and draft treaty versions. A case in point is a memorandum that 
emerged out of a discussion of two US network actors regarding the comprehensive 
working document that the French delegation presented shortly after the start of the 
interstate conference: Robert Bowie, a Harvard law professor with a background in 
antitrust law who as general counsel of the US High commissioner for Germany 
oversaw the de-cartelisation and de-concentration programme for the German 
heavy industries and William Tomlinson, the representative of the US Treasury in 
the US embassy in Paris and director of Financial and Trade Affairs for the ECA 
mission to France as well as financial advisor to the US ambassador to Paris David 
Bruce and a confidant of Monnet’s. The memorandum examined the proposed 
institutional structure and criticised those aspects of the working document that 
appeared to foster cartels and restrictive practices.31 Later, it served as the basis for 
a checklist for the US government to evaluate the progress of the interstate 
negotiations.32 
Informal transatlantic networks further contributed directly to the draft treaty, 
which constitutes a second function and perhaps the most apparent form of their 
influence on the evolution of the ECSC treaty. Crucially, they helped shape what 
became article 65, banning agreements and practices hampering competition, and 
article 66, prohibiting market-dominating enterprises.33 A request to integrate 
specific antitrust provisions in the treaty was only expressed by Monnet in October 
1950 following the start of the Korean War and the subsequent decision of the US 
government to rearm the Federal Republic. A first antitrust draft presented by the 
French delegation contained much more comprehensive antitrust provisions than 
an alternative proposal by the West German delegation and originated in 
consultations with the US embassy working group. In late November and early 
December 1950 this network became intimately involved in drafting proposals that 
then were formally submitted by the French delegation. 
Thirdly, transatlantic networks mediated between different socio-economic, 
political and cultural contexts. In the making of the antitrust provisions, for 
example, the legal tradition of US antitrust law interacted with German 
ordoliberalism, an intellectual movement promoting an interdisciplinary approach 
to integrate economic policy and law that was first developed in the early 1930s to 
generate a response to the traumatic economic and political experiences of the 
Weimar Republic. Central to the mediation process in 1950-51 were the separate 
discussions on the West German de-concentration and the anti-cartel law for the 
31. US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington DC, USA, Record 
Group (RG) 469, Special Representative in Europe, Office of the General Counsel, Subject Files 
1948-53, Box 30, Memo Tomlinson to Stokes, 30 June 1950. 
32. NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files 1950-54, 850.33/7-550, Bruce to Perkins, Check list of first 
draft of Schuman Proposal Working Document, 5 July 1950. 
33. For a detailed analysis see B. LEUCHT, Transatlantic Policy Networks in the Creation of the First 
European Anti-Trust Law. Mediating Between American Anti-Trust and German Ordo-liberalism, 
in: W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), op.cit. 
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Federal Republic which had become intimately tied to the interstate negotiations, 
not least through mutually relating actors. However, transatlantic networks owed 
their mediating function not only to the expertise of actors, but also to their 
biographical experiences as is evidenced by Hallstein who supplemented his 
longstanding academic interest in foreign legal systems with American 
socialisation and further in-depth study of US law while a prisoner of war in the US 
(1944-45) and an exchange professor at Georgetown University (1948-49). Even 
more Hallstein argued for cooperation between ‘diverse legal traditions within the 
Euro-American cultural sphere’ and highlighted the significance of American legal 
thought for the future of European law.34 In contrast German born Heinrich 
Kronstein, a law professor at Georgetown University, adopted a more pragmatic 
approach to mediation by advising US governmental agencies on antitrust policy 
and cooperating with the West German delegation to the interstate conference. 
As a result of the predominant role of academic and other experts, informal 
transatlantic networks – fourthly – facilitated links to a wider circle of academics 
that could be co-opted for discussing the Schuman Plan. One pool of experts 
serving as a resource for the transatlantic university network emanated from an 
academic exchange programme between the University of Frankfurt and 
Georgetown University. Previously a participant in the programme, Hermann 
Mosler, as a legal expert of the West German delegation further invited the 
established Max-Planck Institute for Public and International Law in Heidelberg to 
assess the role of the court within the community’s institutional system.35 
The fifth function of transatlantic networks extends one specific function of the 
Christian democratic party network identified above, namely constructing 
transnational alliances to prevent national administrations and interest groups from 
impeding the interstate negotiations. Crucially this applied to sidelining those 
French officials and industrialists who subscribed to the French cartel tradition36 
when integrating antitrust provisions into the ECSC treaty. At the same time the 
existence of transatlantic networks provided opportunities for actors whose 
preference for a competitive framework was marginalized within their respective 
domestic settings to transfer their policy goals from the national to the European 
level of the Schuman Plan conference. 
Jointly these five functions highlight the complex policy-making processes at 
the interstate negotiations. Further, they help re-conceptualise the role of such 
transatlantic entrepreneurs as Monnet and McCloy who functioned as vital 
mediators between the US embassy working group and officials and politicians. 
Last, we argue that the involvement of experts in policy formation anticipated the 
34. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Nachlass Walter Hallstein (1266), 1620, Letter Hallstein to the Dean of the 
Faculty of Law, University of Chicago, 22 May 1945. 
35. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, B 15 Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman Plans, 
54, Mosler to Karl Bilfinger, 16 September 1950. 
36. On the divergent traditions and mentalities see B. LEUCHT, Tracing European Mentalities: Free 
Competition in Post-WW II-Europe, in: M.-T. BITSCH, W. LOTH, C. BARTHEL (eds.), Cultures 
politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne, Bruylant, Brussels, 2007, pp.337-353. 
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increasing role of expert networks in devising EEC policies as is evidenced for 
example by the formulation of competition policy in Hans von der Groeben’s 
Directorate General IV.37 
Conclusion 
Based on the two case studies of Christian democratic and transatlantic networks 
we argue that policy network analysis from political science can be fruitfully 
adopted for contemporary historical research on the EU, but with one main 
methodological caveat and after pragmatic conceptual adjustments. 
Methodologically, historical research has to rely predominately on written sources. 
These sources do not provide sufficient relevant data for either quantitative38 or 
formalized network analysis39 as two main options in the social sciences. Instead, 
historical research on networks in the integration process utilises a qualitative 
hermeneutical approach for interpreting sources and developing a sophisticated 
narrative of the informal politics of integration. At a more practical level, the 
informality of network exchanges makes their reconstruction more difficult than 
interstate negotiations that are formalized and more comprehensively documented 
in well preserved government sources. The resulting over-reliance on government 
sources by many contemporary historians has clearly solidified the conceptual 
state-centrism of EU historiography. For our case studies we were fortunately able 
to retrieve relevant primary sources in a multitude of archives including the 
protocols of the Geneva Circle,40 relevant policy papers and written 
correspondence in private papers, for example. 
Conceptually, we propose a broader approach and somewhat more general 
definitions for historical research on transnational networks than policy network 
analysis of EU public policy-making. Firstly, we prefer to speak of political, not 
policy networks. The term political network denotes a set of actors engaged in 
communication and cooperation which is geared towards shaping the political 
organisation of social life, in this case in the emerging, highly institutionalised 
multilevel European polity. In our view such a broader definition has two main 
advantages. Firstly, it is not geared exclusively towards understanding 
policy-making in particular policy fields like the environment, for example, and 
37. K. SEIDEL, DG IV and the Origins of a Supranational Competition Policy. Establishing an Economic 
Constitution for Europe, in: W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), op.cit. 
38. See also F. PAPPI, C.H.C.A. HENNING, Policy Networks: More than a Metaphor?, in: Journal 
of Theoretical Politics, 10(1998), pp.553-575. 
39. As an introduction see J. SCOTT, Social Network Analysis. A Handbook, 2nd ed., Sage, London, 
2000. 
40. Excerpts of these protocols are accessible, together with other relevant sources, in M. GEHLER, 
W. KAISER (eds.), Transnationale Parteienkooperation der europäischen Christdemokraten. Dokumente 
1945-1965 / Coopération transnationale des décmorates-chrétiens en Europe. Documents 
1945-1965, K.G. Saur, Munich, 2004. 
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measuring the direct policy impact of policy networks which is characteristic of 
policy network analysis. Transnational political networks have had other important 
functions, too. Contemporary historians may be as interested in studying internal 
processes of communication and socialisation within such networks from a more 
sociologically-informed perspective. At the same time, transnational networks of 
intellectuals after 1945 may have shaped public discourses and succeeded in 
ascribing dominant meaning to terms such as ‘freedom’ and ‘Western world’. This 
in turn may have been a crucial precondition for culturally embedding European 
integration policies. Moreover, networks of political party elites clearly were not 
concerned with influencing only one policy field, but also with European 
constitution-building and supporting interstate relations on European issues. 
Secondly, the broader term political network also avoids an EU-centric perspective. 
As the example of the transatlantic networks shows, political networks have 
operated beyond the boundaries of core Europe and the current EU. They extended 
to other organisational contexts like the European Free Trade Association formed 
in 1959-60 and – especially in the first decade after World War II – the North 
Atlantic political space. 
Secondly, we suggest to use the more traditional categories of state and 
non-state actors for characterizing the institutional identities of network actors. 
One often used political science distinction between public and private actors 
focuses on their objectives, that is whether they pursue ‘public’ (general) interests 
or ‘private’ (business) interests. Political scientists have shown, however, that 
networked business actors have often acted as private citizens and in the belief that 
their proposals – for example in the case of the European Round Table of 
Industrialists and the internal market programme in the early 1980s – were in the 
general European interest.41 With a distinction between public and private actors, 
moreover, political parties, although clearly non-state actors, would qualify as 
public actors just like governments. In our view such a definition not only 
effectively excludes from the research agenda all political networks that do not 
include private business actors; potentially, it could also result in normatively 
loaded debates over legitimate general public and egoistic private interests, which 
would not be helpful for developing a sophisticated historical narrative of EU 
politics in historical perspective. In contrast, our preferred definition crucially 
facilitates capturing the different and overlapping identities of actors. In the case of 
the Christian democrats, for example, leading politicians sometimes acted in their 
governmental state and sometimes in their non-state political party roles, without 
clearly distinguishing between their differentiated institutional identities and 
functional roles. In the case of the transatlantic networks, officials often acted as 
private citizens in social networks formed before they assumed official functions in 
national ministries or government agencies which also resulted in overlapping 
identities. We believe that this grey zone of blurred institutional identities and 
41. See for example M.G. COWLES, Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: the ERT and EC 1992, in: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 33(1995), pp.501-526. 
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functional roles is especially crucial for understanding networks in early European 
integration. 
With these methodological caveats and conceptual modifications we argue that 
in conjunction with ‘institutionalist’ approaches utilized in the article by 
Ann-Christina Knudsen and Morten Rasmussen in this issue, the theoretically 
informed empirical analysis of political networks has great heuristic potential for 
re-conceptualising the origins and evolution of the EU in historical perspective. 
Firstly, it can decisively help overcome the prevailing state-centrism of EU 
historiography in a new multi-actor perspective on EU politics and policy-making. 
Secondly, the study of networks allows us to capture the informality of political 
processes in the EU as a culturally diverse space, which is a crucial dimension of 
its identity as a supranational polity. Thirdly, it enables us to re-conceptualise in a 
radically different manner from traditional diplomatic history accounts, national 
EU policy-making as highly fragmented and influenced by transnationally 
networked political and administrative elites. Fourthly, the role of networks can 
help us understand better the exercise of political leadership under conditions of 
supranational integration, nationally and at the European level, as such networks 
provide state- and non-state actors with crucial resources for developing common 
agendas and pursuing their political goals – in our case studies, the formation of a 
supranational core Europe without Britain and a new legal framework for 
guaranteeing free competition in integrated European markets. Finally, the 
historical analysis of transnational political networks in conjunction with 
sociological institutional approaches, which emphasize the role of norms, values 
and ideas in policy-making, also offers an avenue for better understanding 
integration ideas as embedded in social networks. These networks strive to make 
such ideas hegemonic and to implement them in European constitutional designs 
and legislation. Such an approach avoids at the same time the naïve 
conceptualisation of ideational motivations for European policy-making as 
European idealism as in Walter Lipgens’ early research and its sarcastic criticism 
as celebration of the so-called ‘founding fathers’ as European ‘saints’ by Alan S. 
Milward.42 
Once contemporary historians of the EU have begun to utilize the potential of 
the network concept and approach for understanding how multiple actors have 
related to each other within the emerging European multilevel polity and how their 
interaction has impacted on constitution-building, agenda-setting and 
decision-making, they could potentially also make a major interdisciplinary 
contribution to discussing networks in or as governance in a longer term temporal 
perspective. We hypothesize that networks played a crucial role in the evolution of 
institutional patterns and Community policies in the 1960s, especially in the two 
core fields of the Common Agricultural Policy and competition policy. They 
probably also influenced in important ways the development of new policy 
initiatives such as environmental protection and the internal market in the 1970s. 
42. As in A.S. MILWARD, The Rescue …, op.cit., chapter 6. 
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These transnational political networks may have consisted chiefly of member state 
actors, the new supranational institutions and more traditional non-state actors like 
political parties as well as academic experts. It appears that the farmers’ 
organisations at national and EEC level were the only major business interest that 
was fully engaged from the beginning in policy formulation at the EEC level. 
Nonetheless, member state actors were clearly neither as cohesive and consistent in 
their preference formation before the 1970s as much political science research 
appears to assume, just as they may be not nearly as ineffective after the alleged 
transformation from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ since then. We may well find 
that what was really novel in EC governance in the 1970s was the beginning 
sustained involvement of private business actors in EC politics driven by a fear of 
economic decline in comparison to the United States and Japan, and the activation 
of non-traditional new social movement societal actors, which was instigated and 
cultivated by the European Commission. These remain unanswered research 
questions for an exciting new research agenda within an innovative pluralistic EU 
historiography which should aim at greater interdisciplinary competence and 
cooperation.43 
43. For further suggestions for interdisciplinary collaboration between contemporary history and political 
science research on the EU see W. KAISER, History meets Politics: Overcoming Interdisciplinary 
Volapük in Research on the EU, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 15(2008), 
pp.300-313; Idem., Bringing People and Ideas Back in. Historical Research on the European Union, 
in: D. PHINNEMORE, A. WARLEIGH (eds.), Reflections on European Integration, Palgrave, 
Basingstoke, 2008 (forthcoming). 
